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Abstract:  
China is linked to cybercrimes of diverse types, scales, motivations and objectives. The Chinese 
cyberspace thus provides an interesting setting for the study of cybercrimes. In this paper, we 
first develop typology, classification and characterization of cybercrimes associated with China, 
which would help us understand modus operandi, structures, profiles and personal characteristics 
of cybercrime organizations and potential perpetrators, the signature aspects and goals of 
cybercrimes, the nature and backgrounds of the criminal groups involved, characteristics of 
potential targets for criminal activities, the nature and extent of the damage inflicted on the 
victims and the implications to and responses elicited from various actors. We then examine this 
issue from developmental and international political economy angles. Specifically, we delineate 
salient features of China’s politics, culture, human capital and technological issues from the 
standpoint of cyber-security and analyze emerging international relations and international trade 
issues associated with this phenomenon. Our analysis indicates that China’s global ambition, the 
shift in the base of regime legitimacy from MarxLeninism to economic growth, the strong state 
and weak civil society explain the distinctive pattern of the country’s cyber-attack and cyber-
security landscapes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
While researchers are beginning to address the issues related to the dark side of e-commerce 
such as security breach and other forms of cyber-attacks [1, 2], sufficient attention has not been 
given to this topic. For various reasons, China provides an ideal laboratory to study, observe, 
document and understand this phenomenon, especially diverse aspects of cybercrimes including 
the associated contexts, mechanisms and processes. These factors are tightly linked with various 
key concepts related to e-commerce such as web trustworthiness, information control and 
privacy, which affects users’ perception of e-commerce providers as well as the broad 
environment [3–5]. 
Prior research indicates that cybercrime and cyber-security in developing economies have unique 
structural characteristics [6, 7]. Yet the literature does not discuss how key economic, political 
and social characteristics of developing countries such as low levels of human development and 
education and weak democratic institutions [8] are connected to cybercrime and cyber-security. 
Cybercrime and cyber-security issues have increasingly important international dimensions. 
With the decline of violent geopolitical conflicts, traditional issues such as nuclear war are losing 
their salience and importance and the focus and organizing principle in international relations 
have been on nontraditional security issues including cyber-security [9–15]. Cyber-security is 
thus becoming one of the biggest “hot button” issues in international relations and international 
politics. 
Prior research has also suggested that countries’ military alliance is positively related to trade 
relations [16]. In recent years, a number of alliances have been formed according to cyber-
security-related interests. These alliances have dramatic potential for bringing significant 
changes in international trade and investment relations among countries. 
To put things in context, the complexity of China-originated cyber-attacks has discouraged 
foreign Internet firms to operate in the country. To take an example, in 2008, Google’s CEO said 
that his company would work with Chinese universities, starting with Tsinghua University, on 
cloud computing-related academic programs. The cyber-security environment, however, led to 
Google’s withdrawal from China. There are also important international relation dimensions of 
cyber-attacks originated from China. For instance, an FBI Assistant Director noted: “Cybercrime 
… is the fastest-growing problem faced by China-US cooperation” [17]. 
Scholars have not, however, explicitly investigated these issues. This article seeks to bridge the 
gap in understanding about the role of cyber-security in international relations, international 
politics and related areas. Against the backdrop of the above observations, it attempts to unravel 
the complexities and mechanisms involved in this new war, reconfiguration of the existing 
organized crime groups, emergence of the new international organized crime groups, and the 
changing nature of the constraints facing the states. 
This paper seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, this paper has two objectives. The first is to discuss 
the typology of cybercrimes originating from and/or affecting China. The second objective is to 
analyze the developmental and international dimensions of cybercrime and cyber-security issues 
associated with China. 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first providing a brief survey and developing a 
typology of cybercrimes and applying in the context of the Chinese cyberspace. Next, we 
develop a framework that links developmental and international dimensions with cybercrime and 
cyber-security. Then, we apply the framework in the contexts of cybercrime and cyber-security 
in China. It is followed by a section on discussion and implications. The final section provides 
concluding comments. 
2 A survey and typology of cybercrimes in China 
 
A report of the China Internet Network Information Center indicated that, in the first half of 
2011, 217 million Chinese (45 % of the country’s Internet population) became victims of virus or 
Trojan horse attacks, 121 million had their online accounts hacked or passwords stolen, and 8 % 
were victimized by online scammers [18]. Gao Xinmin, a vice president of the government-
backed Internet Society of China (ISC) noted that China’s infrastructures as well as information 
systems of major organizations and industries have become cyber-attack targets [19]. Likewise, 
speaking at the Fourth US-China Internet Industry Forum in November 2010, Gu Jian, a vice-
director of the Ministry of Public Security ’s network security protection bureau, noted that 80 % 
of computers connected with the Internet in China had been controlled by botnets at some point 
[20]. Many cyber-attacks target China for the simple fact that the country is rapidly digitizing 
and integrated with the global economy. For instance, Chinese consumers also suffered when the 
stockbroking service E*Trade experienced a distributed denial of service attack in December 
2011. 
Table 1 presents some representative studies on China’s position in the global cyber-attack 
industry. A report from NetQin Mobile in August 2011 indicated that China accounted for 64 % 
of mobile Android attacks. The shares of the US and Russia were 7.6 % and 6.1 % respectively. 
In general, most versions of the premium rate “dialer” Trojans are downloaded through app 
stores in China and Eastern Europe. China is also among the top click fraud originating countries 
outside North America (Table 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Some representative studies on China’s position in the global cyber-attack industry 
Time China’s position in the global attack industry 
First-half of 
2002 China ranked 4th in total cyber-attacks (6.9 %)a 
2006 
Symantec report: 5 % of the world’s malware-infected computers were in Beijing. China overtook the 
US in the number of malware hosts 
2006 
An annual survey of CyberSource Corp. ranked China as the world’s second riskiest country for online 
transactions, only behind Nigeriab 
2006Q1 China was the top click fraud originating country outside North America (tied with France)c 
2007 China hosted more malware than any other countries (51.4 %)d 
2007 China ranked second in the list of top infection program creating countries (30 %)e 
Second-half of 
2007 China ranked second in the list of top countries hosting phishing websites (14 %)f 
Second-half of 
2007 China ranked fourth in the list of top countries generating spam (4 %)f 
2008Q1 China was the top click fraud originating country outside North America (4.3 %)g 
a [21]; b [22]; c ClickForensics study; d sophos.com (2008); e [23]; f Symantec Internet Security 
Threat Report Vol. XIII, 2008; g Click fraud network study 
It would be interesting to look at some indicators related to China’s imports versus exports of 
cybercrimes. For one thing, the Chinese government commonly blames foreign hackers for 
cyber-attacks targeting the country. For instance, Gu Jian of Chinese Ministry of Public Security 
said that over 200 Chinese government websites experience cyber-attacks on a daily basis and 
most attacks are foreign-originated [20]. According to Information Office of the State Council, 
over one million IP addresses in China were controlled and 42,000 websites were hijacked by 
foreign hackers in 2009 [20]. Likewise, according to a report of China’s Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CNCERT), the country’s 8.9 million were attacked by 47,000 foreign IP 
addresses in 2011 [24]. The report noted that foreign hackers compromised 1,116 Chinese 
websites in 2011. 
Data proxies and indicators from a number of sources across a long time period indicate that 
substantial cyber-attacks originate in China. First, let us look at foreign and domestic origins of 
malware infecting Chinese computers. One such indicator concerns the malware infection rate 
per 1000 computers (MIR) based on the telemetry data collected by Microsoft from users of its 
security products opting in. The telemetry data indicated that China was among the countries 
with lowest infection rates (Fig. 1). Another measure is Sophos’ threat exposure rate (TER), 
which measures the percentage of PCs experiencing malware attacks. China was the second most 
malware infected country only behind Chile in the third quarter (Q3) of 2011 with a TER of 45 
(Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 1 
A comparison of malware infection rates in China and selected other economies (2012, 2Q). 
Source: [25]. The number of reported computers cleaned for every 1,000 executions of the 
Microsoft Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) 
 
Fig. 2 
A comparison of China’s threat exposure rate (TER) with selected economies. Source: [26] 
The explanation regarding the differences in the two studies is that they differ in ability to detect 
Chinese and foreign malware. While TER captures all types of malware, telemetry data only 
detect globally prevalent malware. A Microsoft report concluded that the low infection rate as 
detected by telemetry can be attributed to unique Chinese malware landscape that tends to be 
dominated by Chinese-language threats not found elsewhere [27]. This analysis is consistent 
with the views of security observers in Europe and the Americas, who say that they do not 
receive most of the Chinese-language phishing e-mails and instant messages [28]. 
It is important to triangulate this evidence with that coming from other sources. In 2005 and 
2009, China ranked #2, behind the US, in top countries for originating cyber-attacks [29]. 
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), 70 % the world’s maliciously 
registered domain names were established by the Chinese to attack domestic businesses. In 
2011H1, Chinese perpetrators established 11,192 unique domain names and 3,629 .cc 
subdomains for such attacks, majority of which attacked Chinese companies and 80 % targeted 
Taobao.com. Likewise, according to APWG, China had the world’s highest malware infection 
rate of 54.1 % in 2012Q1. 
2.1 A typology of cybercrimes in China 
 
It is important to recognize that cybercrimes originating from and affecting China are far more 
complicated than what is presented in Table 1 or what the popular press has characterized and 
described. We first develop a typology of cybercrimes as a starting point and apply it in the 
context of the Chinese cyberspace (Fig. 3). The typology would help us understand the extent, 
nature, causes and consequences of cybercrimes associated with China. This is important in light 
of the reports regarding a division of the labor across various activities associated with the 
Chinese cybercrime industry [30, 31]. 
 
Fig. 3 
A typology of illicit activities in the cyberspace 
Such a typology would suggest how cybercrimes with certain characteristics and behaviors have 
a certain probability of targeting a given victim and what reactions and responses they are likely 
to receive from various actors. A typology would also have significant implications for 
consumers, businesses and governments in taking precautionary and defensive measures. For 
instance, cybercrimes associated with political and economic espionage can result in 
dramatically different responses and outcomes. The typology can also be used to explain the 
shifts in the cybercrime landscape. Furthermore, a typology would help adopt unified strategy to 
fight cybercrimes. In addition, such a typology would also provide a useful basis for further 
research on cybercrimes. 
Predatory and market-based cybercrime 
In a market-based cybercrime, goods and services are illegally produced and/or distributed 
online. There are instance of market-based cybercrimes associated with China. One example is 
China’s export of cybercrime enabling technologies and equipment to international groups. For 
instance, crime rings involved in identity theft and credit-card-forgery in New York City 
allegedly sourced their skimming equipment, including blank credit cards from China, Lebanon, 
Libya, and Russia [32]. In this paper we mainly focus on predatory cybercrimes. 
Combining the definitions of predatory crimes in the conventional setting (e.g., [33, 34]) and 
cybercrime [35], we define a predatory cybercrime as a crime in which an offender inflicts a 
harm or takes property from a victim by using computers or computer networks are the principal 
means. 
Motivations associated with cybercrimes 
The first issue is to examine the motivations of cybercrimes associated with China. Curiously, 
there is a higher degree of prevalence of extrinsically motivated cybercrimes that are committed 
for external rewards or financial benefits. However, while Russia- and Eastern-Europe-based 
cybercriminals’ activities tend to revolve around monetizing from malicious applications, 
proportionately more China-connected cybercriminals seem to be interested in gaining access to 
intellectual property (IP) and trade secrets. For instance, according to Symantec at least 29 firms 
in the chemicals industry were targeted by cyber-attacks traced to China in July–September 
2011. Moreover, 19 companies including defense specialists were also affected [36]. Twelve of 
the companies were US-based, five in the UK, and two in Denmark. 
There are many instances of insider cybercrimes in the West that have been allegedly linked to 
China. A 2011 report titled, “Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace” 
published by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive suggested that some 
Chinese companies used ethnic Chinese “insiders” to steal information from Western companies. 
In 2005, a Chinese intern working in Valeo was detained in France for alleged database intrusion 
aimed at IP theft. In 2011, a Chinese-born scientist was convicted for stealing trade secrets from 
Cargill and engaging in economic espionage at Dow AgroSciences. Cargill estimated that the 
information stolen by the scientist was worth US$12 million in R&D [37]. Similarly, a Motorola 
employee arrested by US Customs in Chicago allegedly possessed a one-way ticket to China and 
proprietary information that was worth $600 million in about 1,000 electronic documents [38]. 
To take another example, an employee at Valspar Corporation, who was arrested in 2009, 
allegedly downloaded 160 formulas for paints and coatings, which were estimated to cost the 
company about $20 million in R&D or about one-eighth of the company’s annual profits [39]. In 
a similar case, another chemist at DuPont downloaded data on organic light-emitting diodes, 
which he allegedly intended to transfer to Beijing University [39]. It was also reported that 
China-based hackers attacked DuPont’s computer networks two or more times in 2009 and 2010 
[40]. In the same vein, a product manager at Ford Motor Company allegedly made unauthorized 
digital copies of about 4,000 documents, which would help him to get a job with a Chinese 
automobile company [39]. 
Nonetheless, while online theft of financial credentials and bank accounts is the signature aspect 
of mainly cybercriminals from Russia and Eastern Europe, some of such frauds have been traced 
to China. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), between March 2010 and 
April 2011, there were 20 incidents in which cybercriminals initiated to transfer large sums from 
the accounts of US businesses to companies registered in cities near the China-Russia border. 
The criminals attempted to transfer about US20millionbutsucceededtotransferabout11 million. 
The attacks mainly involved botnets that are often used in banking frauds such as Zeus botnet, 
Backdoor.bot or Spybot [41]. As soon as the transfers went through, the sums were withdrawn 
from or transferred out of the recipients’ accounts. 
There are also many instances of intrinsically motivated cybercrimes, which are committed for 
inherent satisfactions rather than an external reward or some separable consequence. Especially, 
obligation/community-based intrinsic motivations associated with China-based cybercrimes 
deserve mention. Behaviors of ideological hackers interested in political goals can be explained 
by obligation/community-based intrinsic motivations. Chinese hackers, for instance, have 
expressed patriotic and nationalistic longings in cyber-wars. They have fought cyber-wars with 
Taiwanese, Indonesians, Japanese, and US hackers. 
Technology versus social engineering as the primary tool 
In Gordon and Ford’s [42] categorization, Type I cybercrime mostly contains technological 
elements while Type II cybercrimes have mainly human elements. A high proportion of 
cybercrimes originated from China which pursue foreign targets belong to the Type I. However, 
China-based cybercriminals have also used social engineering techniques to manipulate people 
into divulging confidential information to gain access to the systems. For instance, in a series of 
cyber-attacks, which were traced to China by Symantec, the target firms had received emails, 
which asked them to open an attachment. The emails claimed that the attachments were 
invitations from established business partners or security updates [36]. The 2009 China-
originated attacks on Google, also dubbed as Operation Aurora, relied heavily on social 
engineering tools. The attackers had communicated with employees in US firms such as Google, 
Adobe and Microsoft for a long period to gain trust. The attackers then sent messages asking 
them to click on websites infected with malware [43]. 
Cybercrimes involving social engineering tools that target Chinese consumers are also growing 
rapidly. This can be attributed to the rapid rate of Internet and e-commerce development in 
China. For instance, China added 55.8 million new Internet users in 2011 [28]. These novice and 
inexperienced users tend to lack an understanding of the dangers of phishing and more likely to 
be duped by the phishers’ tricks. 
Jurisdiction of the targets associated with China-originated cybercrimes 
The contemporary Western view is that China is among the biggest exporters of cybercrimes. In 
many ways, much of the current debate about China-originated cyber-attacks represents a cyber 
Cold War. 
As noted earlier, China is increasingly recognized as a major source of economically motivated 
cyber-attacks, the US being the most popular target. For instance, in 2005, a Trojan horse code 
named Myfip was reportedly sending data from the networks of US-based companies to an 
Internet user in Tianjin, China. Myfip sent sensitive documents such as CAD/CAM files 
containing mechanical designs, electronic circuit board schematics, and layouts [44]. Likewise, a 
2009 report of Google noted that the Aurora attacks on its computer systems were a part of a 
larger operation that infiltrated the infrastructures of at least 34 other large companies [45]. Other 
reports had indicated that the hackers had attacked networks of more than 100 companies [46]. 
Cyber-attacks originated from China are highly globalized with multiple operations across the 
world. Industrialized countries are not the only targets of China-originated international cyber-
attacks; in fact, many developing countries have been reportedly victimized by Chinese hackers. 
In 2011, McAfee researchers published a report indicating that hackers operating from China 
stole information related to operations, financing and bidding from oil companies based in the 
US, Taiwan, Greece and Kazakhstan [47]. 
It is erroneous and misleading to conclude that China-based cybercriminals only target foreign 
consumers, businesses and governments. According to a phishing survey released by the Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG) in November 2011, phishing attacks against Chinese e-
commerce and banking sites increased by 44 % in the first half of 2011. Unlike most phishers, 
Chinese phishers prefer to register new domains instead of using hacked domains. A report by 
the APWG in April 2012 indicated that Taobao.com overtook PayPal to become the world’s 
most frequent phishing in the second half (2H) of 2011 [28]. In the 2H 2011, Taobao.com 
experienced 18,508 phishing attacks, which was 22 % of all the phishing attacks worldwide and 
over twice as much as PayPal. 
Opportunistic and targeted attacks 
The next issue concerns the predetermination and intentional selection of targets. As is the case 
of the general trend in the global cybercrime industry, China-originated cybercrimes are believed 
to be more targeted, often tied to specific high value targets, individualized and customized. 
Analysts have noted that a large proportion of the most sophisticated cyber-attacks aimed at 
extracting high-value IP, also known as, advanced persistent threats (APTs) originate from China 
[48]. Note that APTs are characterized by a high degree of stealthiness. They employ 
sophisticated means to gain access into a network, stay hidden and undetected, and compromise 
data for an extended period of time. In order to escape observation and avoid notice, they act 
quietly, cautiously, and secretly. 
Category of the targets and victims (individuals, businesses and governments) 
A critical issue concerns who the targets and victims of the cyber-attacks are. There is a wave of 
cybercrimes targeting individual consumers. For instance, the Trojan horse known as Geinimi 
corrupted a number of legitimate Android games on Chinese download sites, and added infected 
devices to a mobile botnet. In the last week of December 2011 alone, personal details of over 45 
million Chinese consumers were stolen in separate cyber-attacks [49]. Increased digitization of 
economic activities has increased the value of personal information, which has provided 
incentives for cybercriminals to steal such information. As another example in this category, in 
April 2012, Chinese authorities shut down 42 websites, which allegedly extorted money from 
individuals threatening to disclose “negative information” about the victims using fake 
accredited journalists. They had operated under the false names of government agencies and 
public welfare institutions. 
The China-originated APTs have targeted governments as well as corporations [48]. There are 
instances of activists’ engagement in intrinsically motivated cybercrimes for which Chinese 
businesses are the targets and victims. A case in point is the country’s biggest dairy operator 
China Mengniu Dairy. The company’s website, www.mengniu.com.cn was attacked in 
December 2011 after the company admitted that its milk products contained a cancer-causing 
substance [49]. 
Chinese businesses have also become victims of financially motivated cybercrimes. One 
example concerns click fraud schemes. The market research firm Analysys’ survey in China 
conducted in 2006 indicated that one-third of respondents believed they had been click fraud 
victims. Likewise, a study by China IntelliConsulting found that Baidu had a click fraud rate of 
34 %, compared to Google’s 24 % [23]. As another example, the extortion involving fake 
journalists mentioned above also targeted many organizations. 
As another example, a Business Week article (June 23, 2008) reported that China’s public 
relations firms such as Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union and CIC charge businesses US$500–
25,000 monthly to monitor online posts. They help minimize the impact of negative information 
and create positive brand value for the company. There are reports that these PR firms hire 
students to write good posts about certain brands and to criticize the competition [50]. 
Foreign originated financially motivated cybercrimes victimizing Chinese businesses also 
deserve mention. According China’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CNCERT), 95.8 % 
of phishing websites targeting Chinese domestic banks in 2011 were foreign originated [24]. 
Finally, in addition to individuals and businesses, Chinese government agencies have also been 
victimized. For instance, in October 2001, a hacker in China replaced a Chinese government 
website with pornographic contents [51]. 
Category of the perpetrator (individuals, organizations/organized crime groups and government 
agencies) 
Many cyber-attacks (e.g., on Mengniu’s website) may well be the works of individual, non-
organized cybercriminals. There are reports that traditional organized crime groups in China 
have employed hackers and diverted their efforts from traditional activities to cybercrime [7]. 
According to the National Police Agency of Japan, about 90 % of bank accounts in Japan that 
received fraudulently transferred money online were opened under Chinese names. The Agency 
suspected that Chinese organized crime groups were behind these frauds. Yet another example of 
an involvement of organized crime groups associated with China in cybercrime activities, in 
April 2012, Malaysian police arrested more than 200 cybercriminals from China and Taiwan 
[52]. Some companies have also engaged in cyber-attacks on rival companies’ networks. In 
2009, a cyber-attack by a Chinese online gaming company to the servers of its rival companies 
led to an Internet outage in many cities in China [30]. 
Finally, the Chinese government agencies have also reportedly engaged in cyber-attacks 
targeting domestic businesses and consumers. For instance, there were reports that the Chinese 
government agencies sent viruses to attack websites that were banned [53]. 
2.2 Combining different dimensions of Fig. 3 
The different dimensions can be combined to identify and categorize cybercrimes so that a crime 
in each cell (or quadrant) exhibits the characteristics of both dimensions. As an example, various 
categories of cybercrimes are plotted onto a 2×2 matrix (Fig. 4) that illustrates the location of the 
target or victim (domestic versus international) on the x-axis against the motivation (extrinsic 
versus intrinsic) on the y-axis. 
 
Fig. 4 A 2×2 matrix of China originated cyber-attacks representing jurisdiction of the 
target/victim and motivation 
As illustrated in Fig. 4 and discussed above, while digitization of the Chinese economy has 
increased the opportunities for extrinsically motivated cybercrimes, some domestic industries 
such as online gaming are more attractive (cell I). As illustrated in cell II, intrinsically motivated 
cybercrimes pursuing domestic targets have various combinations of perpetrators and victims 
involving individuals, businesses and governments. 
China-originated extrinsically motivated cybercrimes pursuing international targets are found to 
focus primarily on industrial and economic espionage activities involving IP and trade secret 
thefts. Nonetheless, cybercrimes characterized by quick monetization which involve data and 
credential stealing malware aimed at committing financial frauds are traced to China (cell III). 
Finally, intrinsically motivated China-originated cyber-attacks pursuing international targets 
seem to be associated with alleged political espionage activities as well as Chinese nationals’ 
engagement in international cyber-wars (cell IV). 
3 Developmental and international dimensions of cybercrime and cyber-security 
 
To understand the above observations regarding various types of cybercrimes associated with 
China, we look at this issue from developmental and international political economy viewpoints. 
3.1 Economic and social characteristics of a developing economy 
 
Some of the key economic and social characteristics of a developing country include a dual 
economy, low levels of income and education, which lead to low levels of human development; 
high unemployment rates, high degrees of income inequality, and weak democratic institutions 
[8, 54]. Prior e-commerce researchers have linked these characteristics with innovations, 
intellectual protection rights and diffusion of information technology in developing economies 
[55]. In this paper, we would argue that these characteristics are tightly connected to the natures 
of cybercrime and cyber-security. 
For instance, low levels of income and education lead to relative laggardness in developing 
world-based consumers’ adoption of new technologies. To put things in context, many Internet 
users in the developing world are inexperienced and not technically savvy as a high proportion of 
them got their computers and connected to the Internet not long ago. A majority of them also 
lack English language skills. This later point is crucial due to the fact that most of the 
information, instructions, and other contents for security products are available in English 
language only. Many Internet users in economies in the developing world are unable to use IT 
security products developed in English language [6, 7]. 
Equally important in this context is a higher intergenerational differences in computer use. 
Parents in the developing world tend to lack knowledge, skills, resources and capability to 
supervise and monitor their children’s online activities due primarily to a lack of computer skills. 
They cannot thus ensure that their children are not engaging in undesirable activities or have not 
been victimized online [14, 15]. 
Countries with weak democratic institutions face additional problems. In some authoritarian 
regimes, cyber-security measures mainly focus on cyber-control activities. For instance, Chinese 
government agencies allegedly sent viruses to attack websites that were banned [53]. Likewise, 
the governments of Myanmar and Mauritania have allegedly hired botnet operators to attack 
their critics’ websites with DoS attacks [56]. The government of Myanmar had reportedly built 
up an advanced cyberwarfare department within the police force, which, in the past, tracked its 
online critics and sent virus attached e-mails to exiled activists. In 2008, before the anniversary 
of the Saffron Revolution, at least three websites associated with Burmese exiles experienced 
DDoS attacks. 
Finally a developing economy could be described as a dual economy. In its basic form, a dual 
economy is characterized as one that has a relatively developed urban industrialized sector and a 
rural sector [54]. The dual nature of the economy also means that in addition to variation 
between sectors of the economy, developing economies are characterized by an uneven 
development within a given sector [57]. Cybercrimes targeting developing economies exhibit a 
heavy concentration in well-developed industry sectors such as businesses in the online gaming 
industry in China, banking and financial sectors in Brazil and offshoring sector in India [6, 7]. 
3.2 Causes of prosperity and poverty 
 
While there is a wide, vast and bewildering array of ideas that encompass economic development 
and its causes, we attempt to develop a perspective on cybercrime and cyber-security which 
revolves around what we see as the key issues. Based on a review of the literature, Acemoglu 
[58] and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [59] have identified fundamental and proximate 
causes of prosperity and poverty. Institutions, culture and geography have been identified as 
fundamental causes of prosperity [58, 59]. Moreover, institutional theorists consider culture as an 
informal institution [60]. Given that geography has a limited role in cyber-security, we focus on 
the roles of formal and informal institutions. The basic idea is simple: economically successful 
societies are characterized by ‘good’ economic and political institutions [61]. Some elements of 
institutions such as corruption, lack of accountability and weak law enforcement may create 
bottlenecks for development [62, 63]. To put things in context, many developing economies’ 
capability to build cyber-security related institutions, while the states “hold some trump cards” 
“at the most basic level”, for instance, with their power to define the activities that are illicit [64], 
many governments lack technological sophistication and are poorly equipped to fight the non-
state criminal actors. 
Likewise, culture is related to different sets of beliefs regarding how people behave, which have 
strong implications for development [65]. An example relevant to the present investigation may 
illustrate the situation. While traditional illicit activities are more likely to be viewed as deviant 
and carry a social stigma [64], this is not necessarily the case for cybercrime related activities. 
For instance, many criminal hackers based in the developing world see their cybercrime 
activities victimizing developed world-based consumers and businesses as morally acceptable 
and legitimate (e.g., [66]). 
Among the proximate causes are physical capital differences, technology differences, human 
capital differences and functioning of markets [58]. In this paper, we focus on technology 
differences and human capital differences, which are the issues that matter most to cybercrime 
and cyber-security. 
In a framework proposed by [63] for an analysis of institutional bottlenecks in developing 
economies, technology-related issues and factors are present at three levels: technological 
progress and dissemination (institutional outcomes), technology opportunity set (interaction and 
decision area), technology use, adoption and development (intermediate outcomes) [63]. In this 
section, we analyze these elements from the perspective of cyber-security. 
In expanding their attack sources such as botnets, hackers find it attractive to focus on economies 
with less developed information-security infrastructures [29]. In this regard, as to the 
technological progress and dissemination, most developing countries are characterized by poor 
performance in cyber-security infrastructure. For one thing, they lack domestic anti-virus 
companies. At the same time, while the top security software firms are based in industrialized 
economies, businesses and consumers in some developing countries (e.g., Southeast Asia), 
mainly because of nationalism, prefer to buy domestically manufactured software. One way to 
understand the low level of technological progress is the lack of absorptive capacity, which 
means that many developing economies exhibit a low level of national capabilities in the 
assimilation of technologies and associated organizational practices [67, 68]. This can be 
attributed to their institutional and social arrangements [69]. As to the technology opportunity 
set, developing economies have a tendency to use low cost, but insecure technologies. 
As to the human capital, a high proportion of Internet users in developing countries are getting 
computers and connecting them to the Internet for the first time. A majority of new Internet users 
also lack English language. While the developments of user-friendly software and interfaces 
have reduced the complexity and consumer learning requirements for computer and Internet use, 
such developments have not taken place in the development of security products. Most of the 
information, instructions, and other contents for security products are available in English 
language only [70]. Many Internet uses are unable to use IT security products developed in 
English language. 
3.3 International dimensions of cybercrime and cyber-security issues 
 
Cybercrime and cyber-security issues are occupying an important and increasingly strategic role 
in international relations as well as international trades and investments. International relations 
aspect of cyber-security is reflected in the formation of major international bodies and various 
treaties and bilateral, regional and international agreements. As of September 2012, 47 countries 
had ratified, accessed, or signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG). Likewise, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members, has taken significant steps toward cyber-security 
cooperation. 
One way to understand the importance of cyber-security in international relations is to consider 
this issue in relation to traditional issues. A large body of literature indicates that with the decline 
of violent geopolitical conflicts, traditional issues such as nuclear war are losing their salience 
and importance and the focus and organizing principle in international relations have been on 
nontraditional security issues such as small arms smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational 
crime, environmental degradation, illegal migration and people smuggling, disaster relief, 
counterterrorism and counterpiracy [9–13]. Cyberthreat is a legitimate security issue because 
cyber-attacks present threats to national security for the simple fact that most of the critical 
infrastructures are connected to the Internet. This issue is also tightly linked to economic security 
of countries. 
In terms of the roles in facilitating illicit transnational economic activities, Andreas [64] 
describes the Internet as “simply the latest—and not necessarily the most important—chapter in 
an old story”. Many analysts, however, have suggested that the Internet has potentially dramatic 
consequences in terms of stimulating illicit cross-border activities that are unmatched by any 
other previous technologies. For instance, Robert Rodriguez, Chairman of the Security 
Innovation Network and senior adviser to the Chertoff Group noted: “Our nation [the US] is 
going through the greatest transfer of wealth in the history of mankind. And it’s because of the 
increasing vulnerabilities within our systems” [71]. 
Prior research has suggested that countries’ military alliance is positively related to trade 
relations [16]. This is especially true for countries which belong to the same alliance in a bipolar 
system with two roughly equal actors or coalitions of actors that divide the world economies into 
two poles such as during the Cold War. In a system with two major opposing alliance groups, 
countries that are allies tend to trade more freely among themselves [72]. Trade-related behaviors 
are driven by possible security externalities which provided fundamental motivation for helping 
their allies and punishing their enemies [72]. Some economies such as China, Russia and the US 
are concerned about cyber-security externalities of trades and investments in high technology. In 
this regard, new and emerging alliances related to cyber security and cyberwarfare are likely to 
shape the development of international political and economic institutions. 
4 Applying the framework in the contexts of cybercrime and cyber-security in China 
 
4.1 The developmental dimension of cybercrime and cyber-security 
 
In this section, we discuss developmental aspect of cybercrime and cyber-security in China. 
Before discussing the fundamental and proximate causes of prosperity/poverty, it is necessary to 
discuss cybercrime and cyber-security in China from the dual economy perspective. 
Dual economy and cybercrime in China 
While the Internet is not within the reach of the huge poor rural population, some economic 
sectors are highly digitized and are attractive cybercrime targets. Due to this attractiveness, a 
significant proportion of China-originated malware target Chinese victims. 
Being a rapidly digitizing economy with over 538 million Internet users by July 2012, China has 
been an attractive cybercrime target. In the first quarter of 2011, China overtook the US as the 
world’s largest PC market, after three decades of US dominance in the industry. According to 
China e-Business Research Center and CNZZ Data Center, China’s e-commerce market reached 
$703 billion in 2010, 22 % higher than in 2009 [73]. Security analysts have observed that 
phishing and other forms of cybercrimes targeting China can be attributed to an explosion of e-
commerce in the country [28]. 
Cybercrimes in developing economies exhibit a heavy concentration in specific industry sectors. 
In China, for instance, businesses in the online gaming industry and gamers have been attractive 
targets for hackers [74, 75]. These hackers steal gamers’ passwords and login information (e.g., 
World of Warcraft) and sell virtual items such as gold coins, weapons and armor from the stolen 
accounts. The stolen virtual items and identities are auctioned online [23]. Experts say that an 
online gaming account in China can be sold for up to US1,000 compared to US5–10 for stolen 
credit card data [76]. Online games generated US$1.8 billion in 2007 [77], which increased to 
US$6.8 billion in 2011 [78]. Buying and selling of virtual items has been a “mini-economy” in 
China [79]. For instance, 11 members of a cybercrime ring, who were sentenced in 2009 made 
over $140,000 by selling stolen equipment and virtual currency [31]. 
In China’s arguably largest reported cyber-fraud, law enforcement agencies arrested a gang, 
which allegedly stole $48 million from small businesses. The criminals contacted potential 
victims via the instant-messaging service QQ and offered naive users a link to a fake deal that 
looked attractive. Computers of users who clicked on the link were infected with malware, which 
stole online payment details such as login credential for PayPal. The criminals used the accounts 
to buy credits for online games and sold them for cash [80]. 
China also provides an example to illustrate how different regulatory treatment is accorded for 
the modern sector. In 2011, China announced an investment of US$154 million to develop a 
cloud center for high-tech and start-up firms in Chongqing. The cloud computing Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) would be free from censorship. 
The fundamental and proximate causes of prosperity/poverty and their relevance to cybercrime 
and cyber-security with special reference to China are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Causes of prosperity and poverty and their relations to cyber-security orientation: examples from 
China 
 
 
Explanation 
Relevance to cyber-
security in developing 
economies 
Examples from China 
Fundamental causes of prosperity and poverty 
Political and 
economic 
institutions 
• Institutions such as 
corruption, lack of 
accountability and weak law 
enforcement create 
bottlenecks for development 
[63] 
• National governments 
poorly equipped to deal 
with crimes 
• Weak democratic 
institutions 
• Many governments, lack 
technological sophistication 
and are poorly equipped to 
fight the non-state criminal 
actors 
• Authoritarian regimes tend 
to focus more on cyber-
control than on cyber-
security 
• China’s cyberspace 
was less regulated: 
RBN’s shift of 
operations to China 
• Congestion in law 
enforcement systems 
• Regulations geared 
towards cyber-control 
measures 
Culture or 
informal 
institutions 
• Sets of beliefs generated 
by some cultures may have 
anti-developmental 
consequences [65] 
• Cybercrime are associated 
with a lower degree of 
stigmatization than in 
industrialized countries 
• Weak civil society 
• Terms such as 
“hacker” and “hacking” 
have more positive and 
less negative 
connotations than in the 
West 
• Strong nationalism 
associated with cyber-
wars 
• Roles of trade 
 
 
Explanation 
Relevance to cyber-
security in developing 
economies 
Examples from China 
associations such as ISC 
have been limited in 
enhancing cyber-
security 
Proximate causes of prosperity and poverty 
Human capital 
• Most developing 
economies fail to invest 
enough in education and 
skills 
• Lack of cyber-security 
orientation of consumers and 
businesses 
• Criminals have 
victimized naïve users 
and small businesses 
Technology 
• Developing economies 
tend to have low investment 
in R&D and low rate of 
adoption of technology 
• They also have a tendency 
to use low-cost technologies 
• Low rate of adoption of 
cyber-security-related 
technology 
• Underdeveloped cyber-
security industry 
• Low-cost technologies are 
more prone to cyber-threats 
• A high proportion of 
users go online with 
crime prone 
technologies such as IE6 
 
Political and economic institutions 
China’s political and economic system has important ramifications regarding the types of cyber-
attacks that are controlled. One observation was that until not long ago, some aspects of China’s 
cyberspace were less regulated than that of Russia. For instance, the notorious cybercrime 
organization, Russian Business Network (RBN) stopped operations in November 2007. Analysts 
suggested that the group operating RBN shifted its operations to China and other Asian countries 
[81]. China, however, subsequently tightened and restricted crime-enabling or facilitating 
institutions such as domain name registration. 
China took the first major step toward criminalizing cybercrimes in February 2009 by including 
computer crimes in its Criminal Law. The punishment for hacking includes up to seven year 
prison sentence [82]. Gu Jian of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security noted that Chinese 
police shut down over 80 cybercriminal gangs during February 2009–October 2010 [20]. 
Since 2009 the Chinese government also tightened the registration requirements and processes 
for getting .cn domain names. The new rules do not allow individuals to register .cn domains. To 
register for businesses, it is required to submit a copy of the business license. Financially 
motivated Chinese cybercriminals, especially phishers, have been forced to register domains and 
subdomains that are easier and cheaper to obtain. The number of phishing attacks from .cn 
domains targeting Chinese businesses reduced from 2,826 in the second half of 2009 to 162 in 
the second half of 2010 [83]. Tighter regulations in China forced Chinese fraudsters to find 
poorly regulated top-level domains such as Tokelau domain (.tk) for phishing and spamming 
activities. In the third quarter of 2011, .tk domain registration was in the top 10 whereas .cn 
dropped off the top 10 list after declining for some time [84]. Among the 18,508 phishing attacks 
against Taobao.com in 2H 2011, 7,025 attacks had used maliciously registered domains names. 
Most were in .tk and only one .cn domain was registered for the purpose [28] 
A society’s power structure and the vested interests of powerful societal actors affect the way a 
cybercrime is defined and policed. China’s state strategies with regard to ICTs have been to 
balance economic modernization and political control [85]. Stated simply, this strategy broadly 
corresponds to China’s unique approach and perspective to cyber-security is reflected in the 
various cyber-control measures. Although about 40 governments control their online 
environments, few have done so more skillfully than by China [86]. The Chinese government has 
emphasized on healthy and harmonious Internet environment. A healthy cyberspace is “porn-
free” and “crime-free” and “harmonious” means that it does not threaten to destabilize the state’s 
social and political order. 
It is also worth noting that the base of regime legitimacy in China has shifted from 
MarxLeninism to economic growth and prosperity [87]. China thus would like to achieve the 
goal of its cyberspace governance initiatives without jeopardizing its economic development 
[14]. 
Despite the tremendous difficulties associated with regulating and controlling the Internet, the 
Chinese government’s cyber-control measures have been successful in some senses [88]. For 
instance, as presented in Fig. 5, China’s share of global spam has decreased during 2007–2011. 
Spam messages originated from China in 2009 were 25 % less than in 2008 [89]. The reduction 
can be attributed to the country’s regulations and enforcement mechanisms to tackle the spam 
problem. The government reportedly pressured Internet service providers to cut off their spam-
sending accounts [89]. 
 
Fig. 5 
China’s share of global spam (% of the world total). Sources: 2004: [90]; 2006: Sophos data 
from [91]; 2007:[74, 75]; 2009: [92]; 2010: [93]; 2011: [26] 
That said the Chinese government has encountered a host of problems and difficulties associated 
with congestion in law enforcement and conflicts with economic modernization initiatives to 
achieve cyber-control related goals. First, consider the Green Dam Youth Escort firewall 
software program launched in 2008. The Chinese government had announced a plan to make it 
mandatory to have the Green Dam installed in all new PCs in the country. The stated goal of the 
mandate was to protect children from violent and pornographic contents. 
The first problem the Green Dam faced was that while addressing one cyber-security issue, it 
created side effects that raised another. For instance, while it successfully blocked politically 
sensitive contents, many viewed that the software would represent significant risks to users as a 
single flaw the Green Dam system would expose the entire Chinese population to 
cybercriminals. 
A second problem stemmed from the fact that it increased PC manufacturers’ costs, which led to 
an additional financial burden on consumers. While the Green Dam would be free to users, 
manufacturers needed to pay license fees to the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) to install the software. The vendor of the Green Dam, Beijing Dazheng 
Language and Knowledge Processing Research Center (BDLKPRC) had received $6 million 
from the MIIT to develop the software. 
A third related problem had to do with strong opposition from computer manufacturers and the 
public. Even Lenovo, which is 57 % government-owned, opposed it. Internet users, who are 
increasingly acting on a bottom-up approach, participated in collective resistance efforts to abort 
the Green Dam. 
Given the national security and economic risks and a strong resistance, the Green Dam program 
was indefinitely delayed after being installed in 20 million PCs. The unsustainable business 
model led to the closure of BDLKPRC in the 2010 and the company was near bankruptcy. 
As another example, consider the 2011 regulation which required microbloggers to register using 
real name. The Nasdaq-listed Chinese online media company, Sina, warned that the requirement 
would negatively affect user activity and threaten its popular microblogging service, Sina Weibo. 
Even well after the March 16, 2012 deadline, Sina Weibo continued to allow users, who had not 
registered their real names to post and use its services. 
As is the case of a number of other developing countries, China has weak democratic institutions 
[8], which have led to the various cyber-control measures discussed above. At the same time, 
despite China’s fairly sophisticated cyber-control capabilities, the country’s law enforcement 
resources have been insufficient to keep pace with the rapidly growing base of Internet users. In 
this way, as predicted by researchers in others fields [63], the weak law enforcement has created 
bottlenecks for the development of cyber-security. 
Culture or informal institutions 
Just like some sets of beliefs tend to have anti-developmental consequences [65], some aspects 
of culture help stimulate cybercrime behaviors in China. 
A hacking culture 
Recent studies and surveys have highlighted differences in culture associated with hacking in 
China and the West. For instance, many types of “hackers” are considered to be socially 
undesirable in the West [94]. The terms such as “hacker” and “hacking”, on the other hand, seem 
to have somewhat more positive and less negative attitudes than they have acquired in the West. 
A significant proportion of Chinese students identify hackers as positive role models and some 
wish to emulate them. For instance, according to a 2005 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 
survey about 43 % of elementary school students said they “adore” China’s hackers and about 
one third said they would like to be one [95]. Books and magazines on hacking appear to be 
more widespread and prevalent in China compared to elsewhere. For instance, magazines such as 
Hacker X Files and Hacker Defense provide step-by-step procedures and instructions for 
breaking into computers or writing malware. A “Hacker’s Penetration Manual” reportedly cost 
less than US$6 [82]. There are also hacker clubs, hacker online serials, hacker conferences and 
hacker training academic institutions [95]. 
Strong nationalism 
Probably one of the most interesting and intriguing features of cyber-attacks associated with 
China concern their links with the bases of nationalism. China’s strong nationalism is arguably 
related to ethnicity and race rather than universalistic ideals (e.g., democracy, rule of law, free 
marketplace) and institutions [96]. In China, the state arguably has adapted a body of complex 
scholarship to bolster its legitimacy through invoking a deep sense of “Chineseness” among 
citizens [97–99]. In a review of literature, Sautman [100] concludes, “Nowhere is this more 
pronounced than in China, where these disciplines [Archaeology and paleoanthropology] provide 
the conceptual warp and woof of China’s ‘racial’ nationalism”. Observers note that Chinese 
hackers’ nationalistic orientation and closeness to the state is an important way of distinguishing 
hacking activities originated from China. Chinese hackers consider their responsibility to protect 
their country and fight what they consider as imperialism in the cyberspace. Chinese hackers 
have expressed patriotic and nationalistic longings in several cyber-wars. Chinese hackers have 
fought cyber-wars with Taiwanese, Indonesians, Japanese and US hackers [51, 66, 101]. Thus 
when Chinese hackers see that the honor of their motherland is compromised, they consider it 
important to take necessary actions to restore their motherland’s honor, glory and integrity. 
A weak civil society 
Although analysis of the state’s contribution in promoting and/or inhibiting cyber-security as 
discussed above is worthwhile, it is important to understand the roles of the private sector and 
civil society. India would provide a particularly appropriate country for comparison. The active 
and influential roles played by India’s National Association of Software and Service Companies 
(NASSCOM) have strengthened cyber-security orientation [6, 86]. Various ongoing efforts and 
activities initiated by the Data Security Council of India (DSCI) have helped enhance the 
country’s cyber-security. One result of China’s weak civil society and strong state is that trade 
and professional associations are likely to engaging in activities to promote the state’s interest. 
The Internet Society of China (ISC) may be considered as the counterpart of the NASSCOM. For 
instance, in 2001 the ISC asked Internet companies to sign a voluntary pledge which required the 
signatories not to disseminate information “that might threaten state security or social stability” 
[102]. In 2009, China’s dominant search engine, Baidu, and 19 other Internet companies 
received the “China Internet Self-Discipline Award”. ISC Officials praised them for their roles in 
fostering, and supporting “harmonious and healthy Internet development” [103]. 
Human capital 
The human development issue which is among the proximate causes of development [58] has 
special relevance for China’s cyber-security. According to the McAfee cyber-defense survey of 
leading experts’ perception of a nation’s defenses released in January 2012, China is among the 
countries least able to defend against cyber-attacks. As discussed above cybercriminals have 
victimized naïve users and small businesses. As to the cognitive (e.g., knowledge about relevant 
cybercrime and cyber-security issues, how such knowledge is structured, and the way such 
knowledge is used to process information) and behavioral (the existence of healthy defensive and 
precautionary measures against cybercrime) orientations, as one might expect most Internet users 
in China are inexperienced and not technically savvy. Many Internet uses are unable to use IT 
security products developed in English language. Moreover, even if software companies publish 
security products in Chinese, they are unlikely to do so in all the dialects. 
Technology 
Some argue that networks in economies such as China have built-in security mechanisms as they 
have “wired security into their IT network infrastructure” compared to the Western approach of 
“bolting it on afterward to legacy systems” [104]. Contrary to this observation, China’s cyber-
victimization, as is the case of most developing economies can be partly attributed to the 
country’s crime-prone technologies, the lack of absorptive capacity, a low level of national 
capabilities in the assimilation of technologies and associated organizational practices [67–69]. 
As noted above, developing economies such as China have a tendency to use low cost, but 
insecure technologies. According to Microsoft’s IE6Countdown website 
(http://www.ie6countdown.com/), as of November 2012, 6th version of Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer (IE6) accounted for 21.3 % of browsers in China, which is the highest proportion in the 
world (Fig. 6). IE6 is reported to be inherently insecure and hacker-friendly browser. In 2006, for 
instance, Internet Explorer was reported to be unsafe for 284 days [105]. As indicated by prior 
researchers, China’s less developed information-security infrastructures make it attractive for 
hackers [27]. 
 
Fig. 6 
A comparison of China’s Internet Explorer 6 usage with selected economies (November 2012). 
Source: The Internet Explorer 6 Countdown: moving the world off Internet 
Explorer 6, http://www.ie6countdown.com/ 
Developing country-based manufacturers also have a greater tendency to use cybercrime-prone 
pirated products to reduce the cost of PCs and other devices. The documents of a cyber-fraud 
lawsuit filed by Microsoft against a Chinese-owned domain provide a further glimpse into this 
phenomenon. Microsoft’s digital crimes unit investigating counterfeit software and malware had 
bought 20 new computers in China. The unit found counterfeit versions of Windows installed on 
all the machines and malware pre-installed on four of them. It was reported that in one of the 
brand new and direct from the factory condition laptops bought in Shenzhen, when it was booted 
up for the first time the Nitol virus was hidden in the laptop’s hard drive. The virus started 
searching for another computer on the Internet. The laptop was made by a Guangzhou, China-
based computer manufacturer, Hedy. 
4.2 International relations/trade dimension of cybercrime and cyber-security associated with 
China 
As observed by prior research (e.g., [9–15]), cyber-security is becoming an increasingly hot-
button issue in China’s political and economic relations with other economies. For one thing, 
China is facing unprecedented political and trade pressures from Western governments to combat 
and control cybercrimes allegedly originated from the country. 
China and the Western countries, however, have differing viewpoints, assumptions and 
perspectives and hence differing objectives about cybercrimes associated with China. China has 
warned against what it refers as a “blame-game”. In a letter to the editor of the Financial Times, 
Dai Qingli, Spokesperson, Chinese Embassy in the UK noted: “The only solution is through 
enhanced co-operation based on equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit, rather than 
politicising the issue or pointing fingers at others” [106]. 
Chinese officials argue that they should be praised, not criticized, for taking measures to control 
cybercrimes at home and collaborate at the international level. In contrast to the 1980s, China’s 
central government leaders do not ignore or promote piracy and some other forms of cybercrimes 
[107]. In the early 2011, Chinese authorities and the US FBI conducted joint operations to 
dismantle and shut down an illegal website dealing with child pornography [73]. Qingli’s letter 
to the editor of the Financial Times noted that Chinese police helped 41 countries investigate 721 
cases related to cybercrimes between 2004 and 2010. She also said that China had inter-police 
co-operation with more than 30 countries [106]. 
China is also responding to the Western allegations by striking back with a strong denial and 
counter-allegation that US government agencies lack interest in fighting cybercrimes and do not 
cooperate with their Chinese counterparts. Gu Jian of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security 
noted that China had received no response in its request for cooperation from the US on 13 
cybercrime cases involving issues such as fake bank websites and child pornography [20]. He 
further noted that in other cases it took up to six months to receive replies from the US. 
Alliance based on preferences related to cyberspace governance 
We can also observe new patterns of alliance based on cyber-security. Despite a broad agreement 
with the West on cybercrime, China diverges in several important respects of cyberspace 
governance. For one thing, China and some of its allies (Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) have 
different viewpoint of cyberspace governance. One such difference is their preference to tackle 
the broader problem of information security rather than cyber-security. In 2008, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Agreement in the field of International Information Security 
emphasized on and expressed concerns about the ‘digital gap’ between the West and the East. 
These economies have been particularly concerned about the West’s monopolization in ICT. The 
SCO economies like to control information that is likely to provoke what they call the three 
“evils” (terrorism, extremism, separatism). They also consider important to prevent other nations 
from using their technologies to disrupt economic, social and political stability. In September 
2011, SCO economies submitted a draft International Code of Conduct for Information Security 
before the 66th UN General Assembly. Western countries, on the other hand, maintain that too 
much regulation may harm cyberspace security and emphasize the private sector’s engagement 
[108]. 
While prior research suggests that countries’ military alliance is positively related to trade 
relations due to possible security externalities and countries’ motivations for helping their allies 
and punishing their enemies [16, 72], recent observations have indicated that alliances based on 
preferences related to cyberspace governance have strong implications for trades and investment 
in high technology products. An article published in China Economic Times on June 12, 2000 
discussed three mechanisms that Xu Guanhua, then Chinese vice minister of the science and 
technology, thought high technology affects national security—military security, economic 
security, and cultural security. Regarding military security, Guanhua forcefully argued that 
developed countries have put many hi-tech arms into actual battles and discussed the likelihood 
of ICT exporting countries installing software for “coercing, attacking or sabotage”. 
More specifically, the Chinese government suspects that it is under cyber-attack from the US 
There has been a deep-rooted perception among Chinese policy makers that Microsoft and the 
US government spy on Chinese computer users through secret “back doors” in Microsoft 
products. Computer hardware and software imported from the US and its allies are subject to 
detailed inspection. Chinese technicians take control of such goods and either resist or closely 
monitor if Western experts install them [109]. Chinese cryptographers reportedly found an “NSA 
Key” in Microsoft products, which was interpreted as the National Security Agency. The key 
allegedly provided the US government back-door access to Microsoft Windows 95, 98, N-T4, 
and 2000. Although Microsoft denied such allegation and even issued a patch to fix the problem, 
the Chinese government has not been convinced. 
Chinese high technology companies are facing similar barriers to trade and investment in 
Western countries. In the Chinese PC maker Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC division, the 
former’s connection to the Chinese government was one of the biggest roadblocks facing the 
company. National security was a matter of top concern for the US government. Some US 
lawmakers argued that the deal could lead to a transfer of IBM’s advanced technology and other 
corporate assets to the Chinese government. The issue surfaced again in 2006, when critics 
challenged Lenovo’s sale of 16,000 desktop computers to the US State Department. Politicians 
and some commentators drew attention to the potential negative national security implications of 
placing Chinese computers into government offices. They argued that the company’s 
connections to the Chinese government could pose a security risk. Another Chinese high 
technology company, Huawei faced similar barriers in Australia, India, and the US. 
5 Discussion and implications 
We developed typology and looked at the developmental and international aspects of cybercrime 
and cyber-security issues associated with China. The typology would help understand 
cybercrime logic so that various actors interested in fighting cybercrimes can adapt the responses 
to the nature of cybercrimes and criminals involved. For instance, the differences in cybercrimes 
have important consequence for the government’s cybercrime fighting measures. Such an 
approach would also be useful for understanding circumstances, for a simple non-organized 
cyber-offence such as simple hacking as well as more organized cyber-attacks. 
The degree of sophistication and complexity of cyber-attacks that are believed to originate from 
China is intriguing. Cyber-attacks originating from China arguably have caused substantial 
economic damage to the Western economies. Viewed against the backdrop of China’s growing 
size, influence and power, however, Western actors have limited leverage over China-originated 
cybercrimes. For instance, given the current state of China-US relationship, it will be next to 
impossible for a Chinese cybercriminal to get extradited to the US. 
While nationalism issues have been identified in some domestic cyber-attacks, nationalism-
driven legitimacy to cyber-attacks is especially prevalent in those that target foreign websites. 
Professional organizations such as the Honker Union of China (or the Red Hackers) also provide 
legitimacy to such attacks. Many patriotic hackers learned important skills and felt more capable 
of attacking networks for financial motivations. The Chinese economy is also becoming 
attractive for extrinsically motivated cybercriminals. Our findings are contrary to the widely 
accepted belief that Chinese hackers mainly focus on foreign consumers. In view of the 
increasing problems caused by extrinsically motivated cybercrimes, more cyber-police initiatives 
may have to be redirected to fight such crimes. 
Alleged cyber-attacks from China have been among the major forces that is increasingly shaping 
institutions in the US and other industrialized countries. Measures are being taken to make 
cyber-attacks an integral part of risk assessment. In the 10-k reports filed with the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), DuPont did not identify hacking a risk and provided no 
indication that the company was an industrial espionage victim. As noted above, Google 
announced that China-originated attacks that infiltrated the company attacked at least 34 other 
major companies. While two, Intel and Adobe confessed, albeit with few specifics, no other 
companies stepped forward [40]. Given the perception of high-profile cyber-attacks originating 
from China, investors may no longer tolerate organizations’ hesitant and secretive mentalities 
and unwillingness to report cyber-attack victimization. 
On the bright side, Chinese firms have increased investments in IT security products, which can 
be considered as a positive and encouraging sign. IDC estimated that China’s IT security market 
crossed US$300 million in 2010 [110]. Estimates of CCID Consulting suggested that China’s 
information security product market would experience a compound annual growth rate of 21.5 % 
during 2010–2012. 
There have also been a plethora of collaborations, co-operations and partnerships between local 
companies, which have helped enhance cyber-security measures [86]. For instance, the gaming 
company, Tencent shares a cloud-computing security platform with Kingsoft [111]. 
Government-industry collaborations have also culminated in China’s new cyber-security 
initiatives. The Chinese government is working with search engines such as Baidu and Sohu and 
financial institutions to prevent phishing attacks. The top Chinese search engines are persuaded 
to take new anti-phishing measures. Some search engines promised that their search results 
would display a special icon next to the legitimate websites of banks and other financial 
institutions to differentiate them from bogus websites [49]. Moreover, when users search for 
related keywords, the official websites of financial institutions such as Agricultural Bank of 
China and China Construction Bank would be ranked first. 
6 Concluding comments 
A complex interaction of international and domestic politics and economics has shaped 
cybercrimes originating from and affecting China as well as the patterns of cyber-security 
measures. Informal institutions in China are more supportive and less hostile to cybercrimes 
compared to those in the West and some other developing countries. China undoubtedly has 
comprehensive cyber-security initiatives. A great deal of attention is, however, devoted to deal 
with issues that the Chinese government considers important and urgent. For instance, the 
emphasis on creating and promoting healthy and harmonious Internet environment has led to the 
development of sophisticated monitoring and control systems. 
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